Scylla and Charybdis: the European economy and Poland's adherence to gold, 1928-1936 by Wolf, Nikolaus
  
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 834 
November 2007 
Scylla and Charybdis.  
The European Economy and Poland’s 
Adherence to Gold, 1928-1936 
Nikolaus Wolf 
 
    
Abstract 
This paper examines the timing of exit from the gold-exchange standard for European countries 
based on a panel of monthly observations 1928-1936 for two purposes: first it aims to understand 
the enormous variation in monetary policy choices across Europe. I show that the pattern of exit 
from gold can be understood in terms of variation in factors commonly suggested in the 
theoretical literature, which makes it possible to predict with reasonable accuracy the very month 
when a country will exit gold in the 1930s. Second, I analyse the case of Poland more closely 
because it appears to be an intriguing outlier. Poland did not leave gold until April 1936 and 
suffered through one of the worst examples of a depression, with massive deflation and a 
complete collapse of industrial production. The estimated model fares worst for Poland, and 
predicts an exit even later than April 1936. By closer inspection, the factors that drive this 
prediction are the non-democratic character of the regime and a surprisingly high degree of trade 
integration with France. I argue that Poland’s monetary policy was determined by attempts of the 
Piłsudski regime to defend Poland against foreign (esp. German) aggression. I provide evidence 
that strongly supports this view until about mid-1933. Ironically, just when Poland had joined the 
gold-bloc there were signs of a broad strategic reorientation, which paved the way for an exit in 
1936.  
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper takes up Barry Eichengreen’s question of “why were some more 
inclined than others to release their gold fetters?” (Eichengreen 1992, p. 23), for two 
related purposes: first, it provides a comparative analysis of the exit decisions of 
several European countries, linking it up with other recent work (H. Wolf and Yousef 
2005, Wandschneider 2005). The paper is the first to use a panel of monthly 
observations for several European economies 1928-36, which allows exploring the 
time structure of exit decisions in much more detail. I test several hypotheses and 
show that deflation, changes in gold and foreign exchange, a few institutional 
variables and pre-existing patterns of trade integration explain the observed variations 
in exit decisions in the 1930s rather well. Moreover, based on this background, the 
paper explores the case of Poland in more detail. Poland joined the gold bloc in 1933 
and did not leave the gold exchange standard until April 1936, suffering through one 
of the worst and longest depressions of all European countries.  
The Polish historiography so far considers the late exit from the gold standard 
as a “big misunderstanding” (Knakiewicz 1967, p. 336), mainly due to policymakers 
misled by the classical orthodox school who tried to cure the economy by deflation 
(Landau and Tomaszewski 1999, p. 235). The background to this is traditionally seen 
in a widespread fear among policymakers of yet another inflation which would 
destabilize the country and scare off badly needed foreign capital (Studentowicz 
1935) and a perceived necessity to adjust industrial prices downwards to prices in 
agriculture to foster domestic demand for industrial products (Matuszewski 1937). 
This paper puts these arguments in a comparative European perspective and argues 
that from this perspective Poland apparently fits roughly into the general picture of 
exit decision as a function of a set of commonly used economic and institutional 
factors. However, by closer inspection, such a model fits Poland worse than other 
countries and the factors which help to explain the extremely late exit decision of 
Poland are rather specific: a surprisingly high degree of trade integration with France 
and the authoritarian character of the Piłsudski regime. This opens up more new 
questions than it can answer.  
To shed some light into the black boxes of “authoritarian rule” and 
“integration with France” I argue that the Piłsudski regime that ruled Poland since 
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May 1926 was mainly concerned with strategies to defend the independence and 
territorial integrity of the new Polish state against foreign (esp. German) aggression. 
The perceived risk that leaving the gold standard can produce monetary instability 
was in part due to the Polish experience of hyperinflation until 1923 followed by a 
second inflation in 1925-26. But contrary to other countries that experienced a 
hyperinflation in the 1920s, the Polish government was afraid of an additional cost of 
leaving gold: loosing acess to „friendly” capital in terms of the political system of 
Versailles. It is obvious that for her long-run development Poland desperately needed 
to accumulate capital, through savings and capital imports. But the Polish government 
made much effort to be selective with regard to capital imports, increasingly so after 
the open conflict with Germany about renegotiating trade conditions since 1925. It 
continued these efforts during the great depression. Crucially, the exit of Germany 
and Austria from gold in 1931 and the non-exit of France, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands created an incentive for the Piłsudski government to stay on gold as well. 
French armament credits complete this picture, both existing ones and others under 
negotiation well into 1936. Bold rhetoric of monetary orthodoxy and several external 
factors including some signs of economic recovery in late 1932 helped the Polish 
government to defend this position, which culminated in Poland joining the “gold 
bloc” in July 1933. But ironically, just from 1933 onwards the pendulum slowly 
started to swing back. Increasing tensions with France, a temporal improvement in 
Polish-German relations, and worsening economic conditions reopened the discussion 
about monetary policy. The Central Bank started to engineer a slow increase in M1 
from 1934 onwards, but most importantly, there was a growing pressure from military 
circles to speed up the modernization of the Polish army, even without French 
support. In October 1935 E. Kwiatkowski, just appointed minister of finance, started 
to realize his old plans of big push industrialization merged with military plans to set-
up a Polish armament industry. After the Rhine crisis of March 1936 had proved 
French unwillingness to fight for the political system of Versailles, and the defenders 
of the Franc Poincaré had started to retreat, Poland prepared the exit decision. In April 
9th, 1936 a 1 billion Złoty National Defence Fund was set up to finance the 
modernization of Poland’s army, before Poland introduced exchange controls in April 
26nd,  1936 and thereby finally left the gold standard.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II starts with a short 
discussion of five sets of hypotheses, commonly mentioned in the literature to 
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understand the decisions of countries to exit the gold standard. Section III motivates 
my empirical strategy, with a short discussion of binary choice and duration models, 
and some pitfalls in using them. In section IV the data is presented to test the 
relevance of the five hypotheses for several European economies, while section V 
contains the main empirical results from the comparative analysis. Based on this 
background, section VI argues for a specific political economy story of the Polish 
case. Section VII concludes.  
 
II. Five sets of Hypotheses 
 
Possible explanations for the observed variation in exit decisions are in 
abundance and tend to be rather complex. In short, the literature provides five sets of 
hypotheses for the considerable variation in European countries’ exit decisions (see 
also the survey in H. Wolf and Yousef 2005).  
First, countries experiencing bad macroeconomic shocks (either from within 
or from outside) tended to deteriorate their economic situation when pursuing 
monetary orthodoxy, with the result of sharp price deflation, rising real wages, real 
interest rates, growing unemployment and a slump in industrial production (Newell an 
Symons 1988, Bernanke and James 1991). An early exit might have allowed them to 
follow expansionary monetary policies and thereby help the economy to recover 
(Eichengreen and Sachs 1985).  
Second, the promise of recovery from releasing the golden fetters had to be 
weighted against a possible loss in credibility as argued in Bordo, Edelstein and 
Rockoff (1999). Especially for peripheral countries – or, for this matter, new states, 
without a track record of monetary policy - the interwar gold standard continued to 
serve as a “good housekeeping” seal of approval. These results have been 
fundamentally questioned by Taylor and Obstfeld (2003) and may well be time-
dependent: the more core-countries left the gold standard during the Great 
Depression, the weaker the credibility signal of adherence may have become (H. Wolf 
and Yousef 2005). Actually, as argued in Drazen and Masson (1994), policymakers 
may have hurt rather than enhanced their credibility through policies that appear 
“tough” but not sustainable in the long-run.  
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Third, policymakers and their electorates may differ in their adhesion to 
monetary orthodoxy (their “mentality”) because of their own recent experience. In 
countries which suffered a hyperinflation or a significant depreciation of their 
currencies relative to the pre-war parities, one can expect a wide reluctance to adopt 
expansionary monetary policies (Eichengreen 1992). In the Polish context, this is the 
most widespread explanation to understand Poland’s belated exit (esp. Knakiewicz 
1967). Moreover, this should be related to issues like central bank independence, 
insofar as the perceived risk of expansionary monetary policies to produce 
hyperinflation may be smaller the less directly a government can affect monetary 
policy (Kydland and Prescott 1977).  
Fourth, economic integration between country pairs differed widely during the 
interwar years. For example countries which traded intensively with the UK might 
have had stronger incentives to follow Britain off gold in 1931 than others, while 
integration with France may have had the opposite effect. In general, the exit decision 
of major trading partners could force a country to leave as well. The pattern of 
currency bloc formation after 1931 broadly supports this view (Ritschl and N. Wolf 
2003), which challenges a recent literature on the trade creating effects of currency 
blocs (Rose 2000).  
Fifth, the political system prevailing in a country can affect a country’s choice 
of monetary policy or several reasons. The extension of the franchise (James 2001) 
and political instability (Eichengreen and Simmons 1995) might have weakened the 
ability of governments to commit to the rules of the gold standard. Authoritarian 
regimes in turn might have had tools at hand to defend the gold standard and 
successfully suppress any political quest for expansionary full employment policies. 
This ability to defend the gold standard may have also increased with the weight of 
agriculture in the economy, insofar as political parties demanding expansionary 
monetary policies tended to have their electorate in industrial centres. 
In the following, I will estimate the empirical relevance of these five sets of 
factors first separately and then simultaneously, both to explore what drives the 
general pattern of exit decisions in European countries and to see how Poland fits into 
that general pattern.  
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III. Empirical Strategy  
 
 A simple and straightforward way to test the empirical relevance of each of 
these hypotheses is to estimate the probability to exit the interwar gold exchange 
system as a function of cross-sectional and time series variation in a large set of 
explanatory variables. In this paper I use monthly data to track the time-path of 
potential explanatory variables as closely as possible. I follow Klein and Marion 
(1997) who propose to estimate a logit model where the dependent variable equals 
zero in any month when the country adheres to the gold standard and equals one in the 
month that the spell ends. To determine the probability of exit in month t+1 I use 
variables from month t. After the spell has ended, the country drops out o the sample. 
In this framework, the probability of staying on gold until month t+1 (Dt+1=0) and the 
probability of exit in month t+1 (Dt+1=1) depend on the vector of variables Xt as 
follows: 
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The elements of the γ1 vector represent the partial elasticities of the likelihood to exit 
the gold standard with respect to the vector of variables Xt.  
An obvious alternative approach would be to estimate a (single spell) duration 
model as proposed by Wandschneider (2005) and H. Wolf and Yousef (2005). The 
explanatory variables in these papers are in part constant over time, and in part time-
varying on an annual basis, due mainly to limited data availability. That is, these 
models operate necessarily in time-inhomogeneous environments. There are two key 
problems with their approach. First, it is difficult to see how annual data can possibly 
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explain the changing propensity of countries to stay or exit the gold standard during 
the interwar years. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 all suggest that the probability to stay on 
gold should have been considerably higher during the first half of 1931 than during 
the second half of that same year, due to the events occurring in Germany and due to 
Great Britain’s decision to exit the gold standard in September 1931. For example, 
Wandschneider (2005) rejects in her analysis the hypothesis of Bernanke and James 
(1991) that deflation contributed to regime exit, probably because many countries 
inflated immediately after they left the regime. Hence, an empirical analysis based on 
annual averages of explanatory variables will probably miss some part of the story.  
Second, it is questionable whether duration analysis provides an optimal 
approach to analyse the timing of exit decisions. Duration models are based on the 
idea of duration dependence, i.e. that the probability to transit from one state into 
another at time t depends not only on a set of independent regressors at that time but 
is itself also a function of time. While this idea is interesting, it (so far) lacks an 
explicit economic foundation and is at least not directly implied by the above 
mentioned hypotheses. What is more it implies serious econometric difficulties. As 
argued in Heckman and Singer (1984, pp. 77-83), single spell duration models in 
time-inhomogeneous environments (as in the current context) face identification 
problems, because it is difficult to separate duration dependence per se from the 
effects of time varying variables (Heckman and Singer 1984, p. 82). One might expect 
identification problems especially for variables with a linear time trend over the 
sample period.  
Nevertheless, I will also estimate a simple single spell duration model, based 
on the monthly data set, where I include the amount of time a country has stayed on 
the gold standard. I do this a s a robustness check and because it allows the estimation 
of survival functions for a convenient visualisation of results. The next section 
describes the variables used to capture the basic ideas of the five main hypotheses.  
 
IV. A monthly Data Panel for Eight European Countries  
 
 I will test the mentioned hypotheses for eight European countries over the 
period January 1928 through December 1936, namely for the five largest countries in 
central Europe (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, and Poland) and their 
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neighbours France, Italy and Sweden. The list of countries included is mainly 
determined by the availability of a complete data panel for key variables and will be 
extended in future research, but it comprises the whole range of monetary policy 
choices as observed during the interwar years.
 




 



 
 
 

To capture the simple idea that the probability to exit should depend on how 
badly the economy was hit by the great depression I collected monthly data on 
wholesale prices (whole), industrial production (ind), and rates of unemployment 
(unrate), see Figures 1-3.  
  
 
The data on wholesale prices and industrial production are indexed to 
1928=100. Note that the use of index data eliminates the cross-sectional variation in 
levels of industrial production and prices, due to data limitations. The data on rates of 
unemployment refer to the number of registered unemployed over the total 
economically active population to ensure comparability between countries, adjusted 
for seasonal fluctuations by the X12 seasonal adjustment method. The hypothesis to 
be tested is that, ceteris paribus, countries experiencing more severe price deflation, a 
steeper decline in industrial production, and a higher number in registered 
unemployed per active population in month t face more pressure to release their gold 
fetters than others in month t+1. 

  

Next, the idea that countries adhered to the gold standard to gain in credibility 
is explored by using the value of foreign exchanges (exchange) and gold reserves 
(gold) in month t. The commitment to stay on gold in month t+1 is the more credible, 
the higher a country’s reserves in gold and foreign exchange in month t, see Figures 
4-5.  
Moreover, I add an indicator variable ukus_offgold to capture the effect of the 
UK and the USA leaving the gold standard on the sample countries (the variable 
equals 0 as long as both are still on gold, 1 after the UK left gold, and 2 when both are 
off gold).  A significant coefficient with a positive sign would indicate that the exit of 
these core countries out of the gold exchange system increased the probability of 
other countries to follow off gold.  
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Third, the effect of historical experience on the “mentality” of policymakers 
and their electorates is captured first by the parity at which a country resume the gold 
standard in the 1920s as a percentage of its pre-war parity (devalhist), varying from 
values close to 0 to 100. To explore the idea that markets may have considered the 
risk of producing hyperinflation to be lower under institutions that assure central bank 
independence, I use a measure of central bank independence (indep) from Simmons 
(1994) that varies from 4 (non-existent government input) to 1 (chief executives and 
board of bank appointed by the government).  
The political regime is captured by a simple 0,1 dummy (democracy), that 
equals 1 if the country is a parliamentary democracy and 0 otherwise. While this 
changes in the cases of Austria and Germany from 0 to 1 in 1933, the variable is 
constant over the sample time because both countries left the gold standard already in 
1931. Finally, I analyse the idea that trade integration might have affected a country’s 
decision to either join the Sterling-Bloc or the Reichsmark-Bloc and hence leave the 
gold standard or to join the Gold-Bloc and hence stay on Gold as discussed in Ritschl 
and N. Wolf (2003). To this end I use their estimates of bilateral trade integration with 
the potential anchor countries Great Britain, Germany, and France, based on a gravity 
model of bilateral trade flows for 1928 (int28_f, int28_g, int28_uk). This measure 
captures the idea of integration in the sense of (positive or negative) deviation from 
“normalized” bilateral trade flows after controlling for geographical proximity and the 
sizes of trading partners, hence a country can well be better integrated with its second 
largest trading partner than with its largest trading partner. To account for other trade-
network effects, I also include a dummy variable tradegold, which equals 1 as long as 
the country’s major trading partner is on the gold standard and 0 else.  
 
V. Results, Interpretation, and new questions 
 
 I will first evaluate the five hypotheses separately, to assess to what extent 
they can help our understanding of exit decisions in principle. Then however, I put 
them all simultaneously into a “horse race” to explore which factors dominated 
others. All equations are estimated with Logit with a dependent variable depvar that 
equals 0 in any month the country adheres to the gold standard and equals 1 in the 
month that the spell ends. Exit is defined as either the imposition of exchange controls 
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or devaluation. The explanatory variables are always introduced with a one-month 
time lag. 

 Table 1a estimates the relevance of economic depression for the exit decision. 
All coefficients have the expected signs. Both, the index of wholesale prices 
(1928=100) and the rate of unemployment in month t are statistically significant at the 
10% level, while the index of industrial production is not. An obvious alternative 
specification is to consider information of previous months as well, which I do using 
3-months moving averages of the variables in t to estimate the probability to leave 
gold in t+1. The coefficients change only slightly but the fit of the estimation - as 
indicated by a Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic - increases from 18% to 50% (Table 
1b). The fact that the index of industrial production is not significant is probably 
related to collinearity with the price index because deflation increased real production 
costs via real factor costs as shown in Newell and Symons (1988).3 The impact of 
deflation on unemployment is also present but probably attenuated by other factors 
(structure o the labour market, unemployment benefits, public work programmes, 
etc.). 
 
 Table 2a presents estimates of the effects of changing reserves in foreign 
exchange and gold on the probability to leave gold, controlling for possible effects of 
the two core countries UK and USA leaving gold in 1931 and 1933 respectively. The 
coefficient on exchange is highly significant with the expected negative sign, while 
the other two coefficients are not. The higher a country’s foreign exchange reserves, 
the lower the probability to leave the gold standard. The insignificant coefficient on 
gold may well be explained by the fact that many countries which experienced 
pressure on their currency to devaluate tried to bolster their gold reserves by selling 
foreign exchange (Bernanke 2000). Again, the coefficients do not change much if we 
replace the levels by 3-month moving averages, but the fit of the model improves 
slightly as indicated by Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics (Table 2b).  
 
 
                                                 
3 If I regress ind on a constant and whole, I get a highly significant positive coefficient. The same is 
true for a regression based on 3-month moving averages. 
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 Table 3 combines a test of hypotheses 3 and 4, where I estimate the relevance 
of democratic rule, the experience of hyperinflation, and central bank independence. 
While the signs of the estimated coefficients are in line with expectations 
(democracies tend to leave earlier, less devaluation in the 1920s due to less inflation 
implies a smaller perceived risk of leaving the gold standard, independent central 
banks tend to defend monetary orthodoxy and stay on gold), none is significant. 
However, given that these variables are virtually constant over time, it is not 
surprising that they do no help much to explain the timing of exit decisions. 
Nevertheless, in interaction with other factors they might explain why some countries 
postponed exit longer than others.  
 
 
 
 Table 4 then explores the impact of trade networks on exit decisions. All 
coefficients have the expected signs, that is to say, high trade integration with Great 
Britain and Germany tends to increase the probability to leave the gold standard, 
while trade integration with France lowers that probability, and significantly so. In 
addition to that effect from integration patterns, countries tended to follow their main 
trading partner off gold, sometimes with conflicting effects. Consider the case of 
Poland. On one hand side gravity estimates of Ritschl and N. Wolf (2003) show that 
bilateral trade flows between Poland and France in 1928 where higher than predicted 
from an Anderson/van Wincoop-type gravity model, while trade with Germany in 
1928 was slightly lower. On the other hand, it was Germany by a large margin - not 
France - that was Poland’s main trading partner well into the 1930s, but less so over 
time. As will be shown below, Poland tried to reorient her trade flows away from 
Germany as part of a general effort to decrease her economic dependency from 
Germany, especially from 1926 onwards (N. Wolf 2007). The gravity-based measure 
of trade integration apparently captures these Polish efforts to reorient economic ties.  
 
 
 Table 5.1 proceeds with estimations that explore all hypotheses 
simultaneously. The overall fit improves considerably. Again, deflation significantly 
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increases the probability to leave gold, as do lower reserves in foreign exchange and 
gold, while the rate of unemployment has no significant additional effect. 
Interestingly, countries that had experienced high inflation in the 1920s (devalhist 
low) apparently tend to have a higher probability to leave gold, which is in line with 
the historical experience of Austria, Germany, and Hungary, but not easy to fit with 
theoretical predictions. On the other hand, the positive and significant coefficient on 
indep indicates that more independent central banks might indeed have earlier left 
gold as their commitment to pursue low inflation policies even without the fetters of 
gold may have been stronger. The estimation also reproduces the finding that 
democracies were quicker to leave gold, as has been stressed elsewhere in the 
literature (Wandschneider 2005). To avoid collinearity problems I only include the 
indicator of trade integration with France and the 0,1 dummy tradegold to capture the 
effect of the main trading partner leaving gold. Inclusion of the latter is also the 
reason to drop the effect of the UK and the USA leaving gold, again to avoid possible 
problems of collinarity. Here, integration with France significantly lowers the 
probability to leave gold, while there is no significant effect of the main trading 
partner leaving gold.  
 
 
 Table 5.2 shows a slight variation of the specification, where I interact the 
effect of a high inflation history with the indicator of central bank independence. This 
alters and improves the results somewhat. Countries that experienced only limited 
inflation in the 1920s and had a largely independent central bank had a higher 
probability to leave the gold standard in the 1930s. They also tended to follow their 
main trading partners, given the other controls and especially given their trade 
integration with France.  
 
 
How helpful are these results to understand “why were some more inclined than 
others to release their gold fetters?” Do these general findings give plausible stories 
for specific countries? Table 6 shows an expectation-prediction table for the last 
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estimated model (5.2) showing that it correctly predicts the month when a country left 
gold in roughly half of the eight cases under consideration.  
 
 
The key question remains: how much does the model’s predicted time of exit differ 
from the actual exit time? Table 7 compares the actual dates of exit to the predicted 
time of exit.4 The model fits the data rather well, except that Hungary’s exit is 
predicted to be later, and except that the estimated probability to exit for France 
reaches a maximum in October 1936 at just 25% and for Poland in May 1935 at only 
14%.  
 
To explore the factors in the model that drive this prediction in the case of 
Poland in more detail, I re-estimate the exit probability for Poland dropping several 
candidate explanatory variables. Without taking the high trade integration with France 
into account, the model would predict an exit in December 1934, after Italy. Instead, 
if we drop the democracy dummy, the model predicts that Poland would leave gold in 
September 1931, shortly after her largest trading partner Germany.5 If both effects are 
dropped, the model would predict an exit an exit with Germany in July 1931.  
A duration analysis delivers very similar results, the only difference being that 
the effect of neither the index of wholesale prices, nor the index of industrial 
production, nor the rate of unemployment is ever estimated to be significant. 
However, a duration model would predict an exit of France in July 1936 and Poland 
in March 1936. Moreover it allows visualising these predictions as changing survival 
probabilities over time. Figures 6-10 show the various predictions for France and 
Poland from a duration model based on the eight sample countries 1928-1936.  
 
                                                 
4 To this end I re-estimated model 5.2 excluding the non-significant variables, in order to have a 
prediction that is only based on significant coefficients. This has only very minor effects on the 
estimated coefficients, but helps to interpret the prediction results.  
5 For this purpose, I re-estimated the model replacing the democracy dummy (which is 0 in the case of 
Poland over the sample period) by its inverse, an “autocracy” dummy. This obviously alters only the 
constant and the sign of the dummy, but nothing else. Especially the predicted exit time for Poland 
remains unchanged at May 1935. When the prediction is done with setting this dummy =0, the model 
predicts an exit in July 1931.  
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VI. Scylla and Charybdis - Why Poland did not exit, 1928-1936 
 
  The notion of high trade integration with France in 1928 - with Germany still 
being Poland’s largest trading partner - and the empirical effect of the democracy 
dummy hardly provide a satisfying explanation for Poland’s belated exit decision. 
However, they give a hint that an answer will have to take political factors into 
account, and that Poland’s relations with France played a specific role. In the 
following I attempt to outline such an explanation.  
 The return of Poland on the European map after the First World War was 
possible due to the specific constellation that all three former partition powers were 
severely weakened through war and revolution (see N. Wolf 2005). The borders of the 
new Polish state were not established before mid-1921, after several uprisings in 
Upper Silesia and Great Poland, some heavily disputed referenda, and a very costly 
Polish victory over the Red Army, financed by French and US capital and excessive 
inflation taxation (Krzyżanowksi 1976, pp. 13ff). From then onwards, the most direct 
threat to Poland’s territorial integrity was seen in German attempts to revise the 
Polish-German border, i.e. both the division of Upper Silesia and the Polish Corridor, 
dividing the German East Prussia from Germany proper. None of the German 
governments during the Weimar Republic - whether left-wing, centre or right-wing - 
was ever willing to accept the German-Polish border (Schulze 1982).  
In this situation, Poland regarded France as her natural strategic partner, and 
initially, the French were eager to play that role. After 1918 France tried to strengthen 
Poland and Czechoslovakia as an “eastern barrier designed to keep Berlin in check 
and preserve the status quo” (Wandycz 1988, p. 3). French military missions were 
present in both Poland and Czechoslovakia after 1918 to provide schooling and 
technical advice for their armies (Ciałowicz 1970). But in stark difference to 
Czechoslovakia, which inherited most of the Habsburg armament industry after the 
Great War, Poland had no significant armament industry and relied heavily on 
imports. In February 1921 Poland and France signed a secret military convention 
which obliged France to send war material, rolling stock, and technical personnel (but 
not troops) to Poland in case of either a German or a Russian aggression (Ciałowicz 
1970, pp. 403-05). Moreover, in 1921 France agreed on an armament credit over 400 
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million Francs, payable in several instalments, which was seen as crucial for a 
modernization of the Polish army.  
However, the economic realities of Poland in the 1920s were at odds with this 
strategic orientation, insofar as Poland inherited from the long period of partition very 
close economic ties both with Germany and the Habsburg successor states including 
Austria.6 Table 8 shows the percentage shares of various countries in Polish foreign 
trade 1924-1936. The joint share of Germany and Austria in total Polish exports 
exceeded 50% in 1924 and 1925, and about 40% of all Polish imports came from 
these two countries. Also, German and Austrian capital was by tradition heavily 
engaged in Polish banking and the mining industry, hence in key sectors of the 
economy (see Smerek 1933). The implications of this dependency became visible in 
early 1925, when Germany started to bilaterally renegotiate her trade relation with 
Poland after the restrictions imposed by the treaty of Versailles did no bind her any 
more (Landau and Tomaszewski 1999, p. 137). In June 1925 the Germans prohibited 
Polish coal imports until a new trade agreement would be signed, and Poland 
retaliated. The following “trade war” with Poland is clearly visible in a dramatic 
decline of Poland’s exports to Germany, which affected especially coal, but also 
agricultural products. While Poland managed to substitute the German export market - 
in part and temporarily - by exports to Britain (helped by the British coal strike), 
Poland was obviously the weaker side in the conflict, which made a deep impact on 
her economy. Together with heavy tax increases to support the newly (January 1924) 
established złoty and a poor harvest in 1924, the trade conflict produced an 
unfavourable balance of trade and put the Polish currency – just stabilized - under 
severe pressure (Smith 1936). Beyond this, the international political landscape 
changed in October 1925 with the Locarno treaties, which were seen in Poland as a 
rapprochement between France and Germany against the spirit of the 1921 
convention, not at least because Locarno lacked any guarantee for Poland’s western 
border (Wandycz 1988).  
All these factors helped to bring about the coup d’état of Marshall Piłsudski in 
May 1926, with its slogan of “Sanacja” – to “cure” Poland from political 
fragmentation in order to strengthen the new state on the international scene. One of 
the first apparent successes of the new regime was the stabilization of the currency in 
                                                 
6 The economic relations with Russia, in contrast, were cut during the Great War and the Russian 
Revolution in 1918. See Wolf (2006).  
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late 1926 and the agreement on a stabilization loan in 1927, which allowed Poland in 
October 1927 to join the international gold-exchange standard (Smith 1936). In the 
meantime, the Polish government made several efforts to foster an economic 
reorientation of the country reducing the dependency from Germany. The backbone of 
these efforts was the development of Gdynia as main seaport to reduce dependency on 
Gdansk and railway transits through Germany, and the construction of a direct 
railway connection between the Upper Silesian coalfields and this new port. The 
central political figure here was Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, then minister of trade and 
industry. For both enterprises, the Polish government sought to attract French capital, 
not at least in order to create French vested interest in the Polish Corridor. These 
efforts were intensified during the Great Depression, in order to capitalize from the 
weakening of German banks and industry relative to their French competitors. In 
February 1930, after the consolidation of Poland’s wartime debt to France, the French 
cabinet authorized the signing of an agreement with a French consortium for the 
completion of the Gdynia harbour, and negotiations began to create a Franco-Polish 
company to build and exploit a railroad linking Upper Silesia with this new harbour 
(Wandycz 1988, p. 168). In a similar vein, in August 1931 the Polish charge d’affaires 
Muehlstein discussed in Paris the possibilities to replace the influence of German 
banks in Upper Silesia by French capital. “As long as the situation was normal, the 
fight with the German banks was very difficult, but now, when the German krach had 
undermined their authority, it would just be a political sin not to use this opportunity 
and not to try to replace the German capital by French capital”.7  
At the same time, the question of how to finance the urgent modernization of 
the Polish army came up again because the depression started to produce growing 
budget deficits and because the government feared the growing political instability in 
Germany. After a Polish attempt in July 1929 to negotiate a new French armament 
credit over 1.5 billion Francs had failed, renewed efforts to at least get the final 
instalment of the 1921 credit – frozen since Locarno - succeeded in February 1931. 
The deliveries were scheduled for May 1931 until December 1933 (Ciałowicz 1970, 
p. 162f). After this, the Polish side immediately attempted to discuss a new armament 
credit via ambassador Chłapowski in Paris. When this failed, Piłsudski sent a special 
envoy Targowski to Paris in November 1931 to explore chances for private armament 
                                                 
7 Own translation from a Letter of Muehlstein to Polish Foreign Minister Zaleski, August 8, 1931, cited 
after Landau and Tomaszewski (1964), p. 315.  
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credits (ibidem, p. 164) followed by an official request of the Polish General Staff 
about the price for a large delivery of heavy weapons. Note that the General Staff was 
eager to stress in this request the inability of Poland to realize a cash-transaction 
(ibidem, p. 166).  
In this political environment of 1931 it is hardly surprising that Poland 
followed neither Germany nor later Britain off gold. In addition to a possible risk of 
inflation, the Polish government feared to lose access to French capital when it felt to 
need it most. Polish monetary policy apparently hinged to a large degree on the 
strategic considerations of the regime. Two further aspects support this view. First, in 
May 1931 Marshall Józef Piłsudski made his brother Jan minister of finance. He did 
this obviously to tighten his personal grip on economic policy because his brother had 
as little expertise in monetary policy as he himself. Jan Piłsudski was followed in 
September 1931 by W. M. Zawadzki, an eminent Polish economist, founding member 
of the Econometric Society, classical hardliner of orthodox monetary policy, and a 
confident of Piłsudski (Landau and Tomaszewski 1965). In a private memorial of late 
1935, which - importantly - was never meant for publication, Zawadzki recapitulated 
his monetary policy as being based on two principles: first, to finance the military (!) 
budget of the Polish state to which the whole economy must be adapted, and second 
to stick to the gold exchange standard. He describes his motivation for the latter as 
threefold: first, to gain access to foreign capital. Second, to avoid domestic turmoil 
after a destabilization of the currency that could undermine the authority of the 
regime. And finally third, Zawadzki mentions the fact that a devaluation of the złoty 
would “automatically decrease the military budget”, because it would decrease its 
purchasing power abroad.8 In addition, he was positively convinced that it was 
possible to overcome the crisis by a downward adjustment of prices,9 and pursued this 
policy until his demission in October 1935. 
 This came clearly at a cost. As depicted in figures 1-3, Poland suffered 
through a severe economic crisis, with more deflation and a worse decline in 
industrial output than in other European countries. And there was opposition. From 
1932 onwards, a growing number of economists and politicians argued for a change in 
monetary policy, most notably the Kraków group around Krzyżanowski and Zweig 
                                                 
8 Zawadzki (1935), reprinted in Landau and Tomaszewski (1965), pp. 127-151, here especially page 
134.  
9 Ibidem, p. 132. 
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that proposed in June 1932 a cautious devaluation without expansionary monetary 
policy; probably not a solution to the problem (see Knakiewicz 1967, p. 96). Members 
of the Central Bank’s board were split over the question of devaluation in mid 1932, 
but the minister of finance (Zawadzki) had the final say (Karpiński 1958, p. 113). 
What is more, the number of industrial strikes, factories affected and hours lost during 
strikes, started to increase slowly in 1932 (Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939, p. 284). 
The authoritarian government certainly had tools to oppress this opposition not 
available to democratic governments, but it was also helped by several other factors. 
The very high share of agriculture in the Polish economy implied that the suffering of 
a large part of the population during the depression years was limited, as they were 
unaffected by unemployment and not threatened by starvation. As stated in the 
Economist “Polish peasants have been accustomed for centuries to hard work and 
privation. (…) They have plenty to eat and enough to wear, and to the great bulk of 
the population such problems as bank deposits, currency stability, etc., are not matters 
of consequence.”10 Note that this effect entered the previous estimations insofar as the 
rate of unemployment was measured as the number of registered unemployed per 
active population. Given the extreme decline in industrial output, the comparatively 
low rate of unemployment is explained by the low share of industry in the country. 
Also, there were some signs of a recovery in the third quarter of 1932, visible in a 
stabilization of prices, a small increase in industrial production, and a decline in 
unemployment (see Figures 1-3). Another factor that actually helped the Polish 
regime to stay on gold was the suspension of the gold exchange standard in the US in 
1933. Since the Great War, the dollar had been a de facto second currency, especially 
in the southern parts of Poland (due to the tight migration relations of Galicia to the 
US), used for hoarding but also for common bank transactions. After the dollar 
devaluation, many people exchanged their dollar holdings into złoty in fear of further 
losses, and the government perceived this as a gain in the currencies reputation. 
Besides, the depreciation also brought about a relief in Poland’s foreign indebtedness, 
which had already started with the depreciation of the pound sterling, but most foreign 
debt was in dollar (Zweig 1944, pp. 62-64). 
At the London Conference in July 1933, Polish delegates had the opportunity 
to demonstrate their adherence to the gold-exchange standard and joined gold bloc 
                                                 
10 Economist, September 26, 1931, p. 568.  
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with France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland. In its Bulletin for autumn 
1933, the Bank of Poland reported that “the access of Poland to the so-called 'gold-
bloc' made a good impression” (Bank of Poland 1933, p. 83). The government 
probably hoped for some real effects of its adherence to the gold bloc, and at least in 
one respect this Polish policy was successful: it helped to reduce Poland’s economic 
dependency on Germany and prevented Poland to loose “friendly” capital. Not only 
did the share of Germany in Polish foreign trade decline (Table 8), but also did the 
share of German capital in Polish enterprises (from 23% in 1933 to 19% in 1936). 
Instead, the share of France remained unchanged (at 24%) and the joint share of the 
Gold Bloc members without Italy slightly increased (40%, 43%). The latter increased 
even in absolute terms (own calculations based on Wellisz 1938, Appendix A). 
Nevertheless, there are signs that the underlying factors behind Polish monetary 
orthodoxy started to change just before the London Conference, namely with the 
changing international situation after the conferences of Lausanne (July 1932) and 
Geneva (from February 1932 onwards). Piłsudski’s growing mistrust in his French 
ally, which at these conferences showed little interest in the security of Poland’s 
western border, was expressed in cancelling the extension of the French military 
mission in Poland in August 1932 (see Wandycz 1988, pp. 236ff.). Shortly after the 
appointment of Hitler as German chancellor in January 1933, Piłsudski aimed to test 
the reliability of his French ally by ostensibly strengthening the small Polish garrison 
on Westerplatte in Gdansk on 6 March 1933, violating international agreements. In 
France and Germany, this was interpreted as Polish willingness to prepare a 
preventive war against German attempts of a border revision, and France warned 
Poland to proceed (Wandycz 1988, p. 271). Hence, Poland found herself in a strategic 
deadlock, with France unwilling to provide military support and a new dimension of 
aggression from the German side.  
In this situation, there were signs of a strategic reorientation to reduce 
dependency on France and gain room de manoeuvre for Poland, especially to gain 
time and means for building up an independent Polish armament industry. 
Interestingly, it was just in March 24 1933 that the reserve requirements of the Bank 
of Poland were changed, which might be interpreted as a first, very cautious step to 
reorient monetary policy. Foreign currencies and bills of exchange were eliminated as 
legal reserve and the legal cover ratio was reduced to 30% of notes and sight 
liabilities in excess of 100 million złoty. On this basis, the actual cover ratio in March 
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1933 was 44.8% (Smith 1936). Hence, while the Bank of Poland’s notes were still 
redeemable in currencies convertible into gold at mint parity and Poland was arguably 
still on the gold-exchange standard, it would have in principle allowed the Bank of 
Poland to engineer some monetary expansion. Indeed, in difference to other countries 
on gold, Poland managed a stabilization of M1 in 1933 and a very small increase 
afterwards (Bernanke 2000, p. 140), due a cautious credit expansion (Karpiński 1958, 
p. 166). But still, this can hardly be interpreted as expansionary monetary policy since 
the cover ratio was kept well above the legal requirement (Knakiewicz 1967, p. 148) 
and contraction in private banking continued. Zawadzki and others, responsible for 
monetary policy, and backed by Piłsudski himself, still believed that the benefits from 
deflation were higher than its cost. But by 1933 they had certainly lost their illusions 
on French help. According to the testimony of Adam Koc, deputy minister of finance 
under Zawadzki and another confident of Piłsudski “cooperation with French capital 
was the aim of our economic policy (…) up to the beginning of 1933” (cited after 
Wandycz 1988, p. 454).  
The surprising rapprochement between Poland and Germany with the Non-
Aggression Pact of January 1934, concluded for a period of 10 years, fits well into the 
picture of Poland trying to gain time (Wandycz 1988). While the pact served Hitler to 
substantiate his claim of peaceful intentions (…) after leaving the League (Bullock, 
1962, p. 325), for the Polish government it was a main step of turning away from 
France towards a balanced neutrality between Moscow and Berlin, based on its own 
strengths. To this end, Polish military circles pressed for a rapid modernization of the 
army, visible in dramatic changes in the military budget after 1933 towards modern 
weapons, and for a state-funded armament industry. But Piłsudski himself was 
reluctant to follow their far-reaching requests (Krzyżanowski 1976, pp. 85ff.). Among 
the several effects of the death of Marshall Piłsudski in May 1935 was the political 
comeback of Kwiatkowski, “father of the harbour of Gdynia” who had left the 
government in 1930 over a row with the Marshall about the oppression of the 
democratic opposition and argued for a strong interventionist economic policy 
(Drozdowski 2001). In October 1935 Kwiatkowski replaced Zawadzki as minister of 
finance, and in December 1935 the Cabinet decided on a 4-year investment plan, that 
merged older plans for “big-push” industrialization with plans for setting up a large-
scale Polish armament industry to be concentrated in the “Security Triangle” formed 
by Vistula and San (see Strobel 1975, Landau and Tomaszewski 1999). In the 
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meantime the economic pressure to finally release the “golden fetters” had increased 
sharply, with a large decline in Poland’s reserves from mid-1935 onwards (see Figure 
5b), mainly due to the imposition of new exchange restrictions in Germany and 
elsewhere. Poland’s membership in the gold-bloc had become a façade without any 
economic foundations.  
The time to act finally came in March 1936 with the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland, when Germany de facto cancelled the treaty of Locarno. Poland signalled 
her preparation to support France in an armed conflict in the spirit of the 1921 
convention, but France did not react (Ciałowicz 1970, p. 216f). Moreover, the 
changing political climate in France, with an expected success of Blum’s Front 
Populaire questioned the future of the gold bloc altogether (Mouré 2002, p. 209ff.). 
On 9th April, 1936 a National Defence Fund was set up by presidential decree to be 
equipped with 1 billion złoty over the period 1937-40 in order to finance the 
modernization of Poland’s army (Krzyżanowski 1976, p. 146), apparently in 
anticipation of a radical change in monetary policy. Only two weeks later, on 26nd  
April 1936 another presidential decree introduced exchange controls, and thereby 
ended Poland’s adherence to the gold-exchange standard. The half-official Monthly 
Bulletin of the state-owned Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), published in 
French, defended this step as follows: “Therefore, the introduction of exchange 
controls was not directly determined by economic difficulties. The Polish government 
saw itself forced to this radical step in the first place in order to fight the currency 
speculation, which has developed recently and to stop the tendencies of hoarding, 
encouraged mainly by events from the domain of international politics. The 
aggravation of the political situation in Europe and the threat of war have had a 
negative impact on all countries and in the first place on the members of the gold bloc 
(…)” (BGK 1936, IX (4), p. 2).   
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
 This paper has two purposes. First, it explores the timing of exit decisions for 
European countries based on a panel of monthly observations 1928-1936 in order to 
understand the enormous variation in monetary policy choices across Europe. I have 
shown that the pattern of exit can be explained in terms of variation in a couple of 
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variables, all founded in economic theory. These variables are economic shocks (price 
deflation), the changing credibility of currency pegs visible from varying stock of 
gold and exchange reserves, the recent history of the currency in relation to the degree 
of central bank independence, the democratic character of the government, and the 
pattern of trade. Together they predict reasonably well the time when countries chose 
to exit the gold-exchange standard. 
Second, I analyse the case of Poland more closely, which appeared to be an 
outlier for several reasons. To start with, Poland suffered through one of the worst 
examples of a depression, with massive deflation, a collapse of industrial production 
and huge unemployment. Moreover, the model fared worse to predict Poland’s late 
exit in April 1936 but predicted an exit in mid-1935. By closer inspection, the factors 
that drive this prediction are the authoritarian character of the regime and a 
surprisingly high degree of trade integration with France in 1928, given the size and 
geographical situation of the country, rather “black boxes” than satisfying 
explanations. To explore these black boxes I argue that the Piłsudski regime that ruled 
Poland since May 1926 was mainly concerned with strategies to defend the 
independence and territorial integrity of the new Polish state against foreign (esp. 
German) aggression. The perceived risk that leaving the gold standard can produce 
monetary instability was in part due to the Polish experience of hyperinflation until 
1923 followed by a second inflation in 1925-26. But in difference to other countries 
that experienced a hyperinflation in the 1920s, the Polish government was afraid of 
some additional costs of leaving gold: loosing acess to „friendly” capital in terms of 
the political system of Versailles. It is obvious that for her long-run development 
Poland desperately needed capital accumulation, through savings and capital imports. 
But the Polish government made some effort to be selective with regard to capital 
imports, increasingly so after the open conflict with Germany about renegotiating 
trade conditions since 1925. It continued these efforts during the great depression and 
the exit of Germany from gold in 1931 with France staying on gold created an 
incentive for the Piłsudski government to stay as well. French armament credits, both 
existing ones and others under negotiation well into 1936 complete this picture. Bold 
rhetoric of monetary orthodoxy, and several external factors including some signs of 
economic recovery in late 1932 helped the Polish government to defend this position, 
which culminated in Poland joining the “gold bloc” in July 1933.  
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But ironically, just from 1933 onwards the pendulum slowly started to swing 
back. Increasing tensions with France, a temporal improvement in Polish-German 
relations, and worsening economic conditions reopened the discussion about 
monetary policy. The Central Bank started to engineer a slow increase in M1 from 
1934 onwards, but most importantly, there was a growing pressure from military 
circles to speed up the modernization of the Polish army, even without French 
support. In October 1935 E. Kwiatkowski, just appointed minister of finance, started 
to realize his old plans of big push industrialization merged with military plans to set-
up a Polish armament industry. After the Rhine crisis of March 1936 had proved 
French unwillingness to fight for the political system of Versailles, and the defenders 
of the Franc Poincaré started to retreat, Poland prepared the exit decision. In April 9 
1936 a 1 Billion Złoty National Defence Fund was set up to finance the modernization 
of Poland’s army, before Poland introduced exchange controls in April 26 1936 and 
thereby finally left the gold-exchange standard.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1a: H1, economic pressure, levels 
 
Dependent Variable: DEPVAR  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample (adjusted): 1 2312   
Included observations: 466 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -2.039938 2.574261 -0.792436 0.4281 
WHOLE -0.073319 0.038806 -1.889350 0.0588 
IND 0.028440 0.043841 0.648715 0.5165 
UNRATE_C12 62.35208 24.68446 2.525965 0.0115 
McFadden R-squared 0.12, HL-Stat: 11.36, Prob. Chi-Sq (8): 0.182 
 
 
Table 1b: H1, economic pressure, 3-months moving averages 
 
Dependent Variable: DEPVAR  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample (adjusted): 3 2312   
Included observations: 456 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -1.774641 2.531337 -0.701069 0.4833 
MAWHOLE -0.067552 0.039469 -1.711507 0.0870 
MAIND 0.021062 0.044536 0.472907 0.6363 
MAUNRATE_C12 61.29326 25.32281 2.420477 0.0155 
McFadden R-squared 0.11, HL-Stat: 7.332, Prob. Chi-Sq (8): 0.501 
 
Table 2a: H2, reserves and credibility, levels 
 
Dependent Variable: DEPVAR  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample (adjusted): 1 2312   
Included observations: 488 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -2.741033 0.694008 -3.949571 0.0001 
UKUS_OFF -0.100742 0.482014 -0.209001 0.8344 
EXCHANGE -0.018815 0.010348 -1.818193 0.0690 
GOLD 5.05E-05 0.000371 0.136094 0.8917 
    McFadden R-squared 0.103, HL-Stat. 10.201, Chi-Sq (8) 0.251 
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Table 2b: H2, reserves and credibility, 3-month moving averages 
 
Dependent Variable: DEPVAR  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample (adjusted): 3 2312   
Included observations: 475 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -3.026788 0.728924 -4.152405 0.0000 
UKUS_OFF -0.002552 0.498343 -0.005120 0.9959 
MAEXCHANGE -0.012743 0.007021 -1.612554 0.1078 
MAGOLD 1.05E-05 0.000351 0.030061 0.9760 
    McFadden R-squared 0.077, HL-Stat 9.738, Prob Chi-Sq (8) 0.284 
 
Table 3: H3, H4, Democracy, Inflation History,  
and Central Bank Independence 
 
Dependent Variable: DEPVAR  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample (adjusted): 1 2312   
Included observations: 489 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -4.094201 1.253620 -3.265902 0.0011 
DEMOCRACY 0.307347 0.807283 0.380717 0.7034 
INDEP -0.116257 0.738427 -0.157439 0.8749 
DEVALHIST 0.001005 0.012783 0.078637 0.9373 
    McFadden R-squared 0.002, HL-Stat 7.12, Prob Chi-Sq (8) 0.524 
 
Table 4: H5, Trade Patterns 
 
Dependent Variable: DEPVAR  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample (adjusted): 1 2312   
Included observations: 489 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -2.964007 0.706302 -4.196515 0.0000 
INT28_F -2.029975 1.217483 -1.667353 0.0954 
INT28_G 0.128728 0.904204 0.142366 0.8868 
INT28_UK -0.524960 0.980191 -0.535569 0.5923 
TRADEGOLD -2.771608 1.139485 -2.432334 0.0150 
    McFadden R-squared 0.106, HL-Stat 13.20, Prob Chi-Sq (8) 0.105 
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Table 5.1: H1-H5 
 
Dependent Variable: DEPVAR   
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample (adjusted): 3 2312   
Included observations: 455 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C 99.19615 39.09163 2.537529 0.0112 
MAWHOLE -2.207611 0.811848 -2.719241 0.0065 
MAIND 0.039567 0.273915 0.144450 0.8851 
MAUNRATE_C12 -184.2775 128.1065 -1.438471 0.1503 
MAEXCHANGE -0.298000 0.127072 -2.345139 0.0190 
MAGOLD -0.016363 0.006212 -2.634117 0.0084 
DEVALHIST -0.169064 0.107049 -1.579312 0.1143 
INDEP 20.85372 8.010818 2.603195 0.0092 
DEMOCRACY 75.41609 25.96867 2.904119 0.0037 
TRADEGOLD -1.981115 2.611545 -0.758599 0.4481 
INT28_F -13.38321 7.051644 -1.897885 0.0577 
    McFadden R-squared 0.722, HL-Stat, Prob Chi-Sq (8)  
 
 
Table 5.2: H1-H5, Modified  
 
Dependent Variable: DEPVAR   
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample (adjusted): 3 2312   
Included observations: 455 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C 26.37953 14.58618 1.808530 0.0705 
MAWHOLE -0.548437 0.202767 -2.704762 0.0068 
MAIND 0.071871 0.169567 0.423852 0.6717 
MAUNRATE_C12 -5.429458 87.67972 -0.061924 0.9506 
MAEXCHANGE -0.219940 0.086733 -2.535841 0.0112 
MAGOLD -0.003049 0.001438 -2.121006 0.0339 
DEVALHIST*(IN
DEP) 0.036078 0.019051 1.893773 0.0583 
DEMOCRACY 30.59431 10.88935 2.809562 0.0050 
TRADEGOLD -5.697179 2.524567 -2.256695 0.0240 
INT28_F -9.881372 5.831804 -1.694394 0.0902 
    McFadden R-squared 0.551, HL-Stat, Prob Chi-Sq (8) 
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Table 6: Expectation Prediction Table (for 5.2) 
 
Dependent Variable: DEPVAR    
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing)  
Date: 11/08/06   Time: 16:44    
Sample (adjusted): 3 2312    
Included observations: 455 after adjustments   
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5)  
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
E(# of 
Dep=0) 442.63 4.37 447.00 439.14 7.86 447.00 
E(# of 
Dep=1) 4.37 3.63 8.00 7.86 0.14 8.00 
Total 447.00 8.00 455.00 447.00 8.00 455.00 
Correct 442.63 3.63 446.25 439.14 0.14 439.28 
% Correct 99.02 45.33 98.08 98.24 1.76 96.55 
% Incorrect 0.98 54.67 1.92 1.76 98.24 3.45 
Total Gain* 0.78 43.58 1.53    
Percent 
Gain** 44.36 44.36 44.36    
*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) 
specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
 
 
Table 7: Actual and Predicted Exit Dates (for 5.2, significant variables) 
 
 Actual Exit Predicted Exit: 
5.0)1(Pr 1 ≥=+ XDob tt
Predicted 
Exit w/o 1-
democracy 
Predicted 
Exit w/o 
int28_F 
Austria 09/1931 09/1931 - - 
Czechoslovakia 09/1931 10/1931 - - 
France 09/1936 Not before 12/1936 - - 
Germany 07/1931 07/1931 - - 
Hungary 07/1931 09/1932 - - 
Italy 05/1934 05/1934 - - 
Poland 04/1936 Not before 12/1936 09/1931 12/1934 
Sweden 09/1931 09/1931 - - 
Actual Exit defined as imposition of exchange controls and/ or devaluation 
Sources: Bernanke and James (1991), Eichengreen (1992) 
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Table 8: Polish Foreign Trade Relations, 1924-1936 
  
Shares in Total Polish Imports/ Shares in Total Polish Exports 
  Germany Austria UK and 
Ireland 
France GoldBloc 
1924 34.5/ 43.2 11.7/ 10.1 7.5/ 10.5 4.9/ 4.2 15.2/ 10.0 
1925 31.0/ 41.3 9.7/ 12.4 7.9/ 7.9 5.8/ 1.7 15.1/ 7.9 
1926 23.6/ 25.3 6.8/ 10.3 10.5/ 17.1 7.4/ 3.6 20.2/ 12.4 
1927 25.5/ 32.0 6.5/ 11.0 9.4/ 12.2 7.5/ 1.7 18.3/ 10.4 
1928 26.9/ 34.3 6.6/ 12.4 9.3/ 9.1 7.4/ 1.7 18.6/ 9.8 
1929 27.3/ 31.2 5.8/ 10.5 8.5/ 10.2 6.9/ 2.2 18.9/ 10.2 
1930 27.0/ 25.8 5.7/ 9.3 7.9/ 12.1 6.7/ 3.1 19.6/ 12.4 
1931 24.5/ 16.8 5.1/ 9.3 7.1/ 16.9 7.5/ 5.5  22.3/ 17.5 
1932 20.1/ 16.2 4.4/ 8.0 8.7/ 16.4 6.9/ 5.7 22.1/ 20.8 
1933 17.6/ 17.5 4.3/ 5.8 10.0/ 19.2 6.8/ 5.5 21.7/ 20.2 
1934 13.6/ 16.5 4.6/ 5.9 10.8/ 21.2 5.8/ 4.2 21.2/ 19.3 
1935 14.4/ 15.1 4.8/ 6.4 13.5/ 19.9  4.9/ 3.5 18.8/ 18.3 
Source: Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Główny Urząd 
Statystyczny. Warsaw. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Index of Wholesale Prices (1928=100)
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Figure 2: Index of Industrial Production (1928=100)
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Figure 3: Rate of Unemployment
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Figure 4a: Foreign Exchange Reserves
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Figure 4b: Foreign Excnage Reserves w/o Fr, Ger, It
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Figure 5a: Gold Reserves
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Figure 5b: Gold Reserves w/o Fr, Ger, It
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Fig. 6: Survival Probability to stay on Gold, France 1928-1936
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Fig. 7: Survival Probability to stay on Gold, Poland 1928-1936
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Fig. 8: Survival Probability to stay on Gold, Poland 1928-1936, 
w/o effect of trade integration with France
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Fig. 9: Survival Probability to sta on Gold, Poland 1928-1936, 
w/o democracy effect
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Figure 10: Survival Probability to stay on Gold, Poland 1928-1936, 
w/o effects of democracy and trade integration with France
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